Cloned Nigerian Anchor

Author: Chris Echikwu

  • The Marginalisation of Benue Zone C

    The Marginalisation of Benue Zone C

    Deleterious Effects on President Tinubu’s 2027 Presidential Election Prospects and the Unwitting Drift of Zone C to the ADC

    By Chris Echikwu

    The deepening political marginalisation of Benue State’s Zone C has evolved from a long-standing grievance into a full-scale electoral threat with direct implications for President Bola Tinubu’s 2027 re-election bid. Nearly five decades after Benue State was created, the Idoma and Igede peoples of Benue South remain completely excluded from the state’s highest executive and legislative offices, an imbalance now fuelling an organised political realignment toward the opposition African Democratic Congress (ADC).

    Political analysts warn that unless urgently addressed, this exclusion could trigger the collapse of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) structure across Benue South’s nine local government areas, with devastating consequences for Tinubu’s presidential vote tally in a state he cannot afford to lose.

    A Historical Exclusion Hardened Into Policy

    Benue State is divided into three senatorial districts: Zones A and B, dominated by Tiv-speaking communities, and Zone C, Benue South, home primarily to the Idoma and Igede peoples. Since the state’s creation in 1976, every governor and every Speaker of the Benue State House of Assembly has come from Zones A or B.

    Traditionally, political balance was loosely maintained through the allocation of deputy positions and the powerful Secretary to the State Government (SSG) slot to Zone C. That convention began to unravel during the second term of former governor Samuel Ortom, when an Idoma SSG was replaced by a Tiv appointee. The current administration under Governor Hyacinth Alia has not only retained this structure but reinforced it.

    To political leaders in Zone C, the message is unmistakable: exclusion is no longer incidental, it is systemic.

    2023: Votes Delivered, Exclusion Returned

    The sense of betrayal peaked after the 2023 governorship election. Electoral data and party intelligence indicate that APC’s performance in Benue was significantly bolstered by turnout and bloc voting from Zone C. Yet, unlike previous electoral cycles, no substantive concessions followed, not even symbolic gestures.

    The SSG position remained outside Zone C, key appointments bypassed the zone, and no credible zoning discussion for the 2027 governorship emerged. For many Idoma political actors, this marked the end of goodwill politics.

    Why Zone C Is Drifting to the ADC

    The political vacuum created by APC’s internal crisis has been swiftly occupied by the ADC, which is increasingly viewed in Benue South as a viable platform for both protest and power.

    The ADC’s growing influence is underpinned by heavyweight political figures, including former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, former Benue governor Gabriel Suswam, and former Senate President David Mark. Their combined networks give the ADC instant organisational depth across the North-Central region.

    Suswam’s deep understanding of Benue’s internal political fault lines, particularly the Zone C grievance, has made him a highly effective bridge between the ADC and disaffected APC stakeholders. For many in Zone C, the ADC now represents not just opposition, but recognition.

    APC in Benue South: An Implosion in Plain Sight

    The crisis within the APC has spilled into the open. A coalition of APC stakeholders from Benue South has publicly accused the state party chairman and traditional authorities of imposing candidates and appointments, undermining party legitimacy at the grassroots.

    More alarming for the Tinubu campaign is the structural consequence: once the party’s ward and local government machinery collapses, presidential votes cannot be mobilised. In Nigeria’s electoral system, governorship and presidential campaigns rely on the same local structures. A broken APC in Zone C for the governorship race is automatically a broken APC for Tinubu’s presidential campaign.

    Benue: A State Tinubu Cannot Lose

    Benue State is not electorally optional for Tinubu. It was one of only six northern states he carried in the 2023 presidential election. The North-Central zone has been identified by APC strategists as decisive terrain for 2027, with ambitious targets of securing up to 90 per cent of regional votes.

    Zone C’s nine local government areas represent a substantial share of Benue’s voter population. Even partial defection or organised voter apathy in the zone could flip the state, and with it, undermine Tinubu’s broader North-Central strategy.

    The demolition of Tinubu’s campaign office in Makurdi shortly after its commissioning has only reinforced perceptions of institutional dysfunction and hostility within the APC’s Benue structure.

    A Regional Grievance With National Implications

    Zone C’s alienation resonates beyond Benue. It feeds into a wider North-Central narrative of marginalisation, insecurity, and political disposability—sentiments the ADC is actively consolidating into a regional movement.

    David Mark’s stature on security issues, combined with Suswam’s organisational reach, gives the ADC a compelling alternative message in communities battered by herder-farmer violence and state neglect. For many voters, the choice is no longer ideological but existential.

    What Tinubu Must Do—And Fast

    Political observers agree that cosmetic interventions will not suffice. To arrest the drift, decisive national-level action is required:

    • Direct Presidential Engagement: A public, personal intervention by President Tinubu with Zone C leaders would signal seriousness and reset trust.
    • Substantive Federal Appointments: High-impact federal positions for respected Idoma and Igede figures would demonstrate inclusion beyond rhetoric.
    • A Binding 2027 Zoning Commitment: Without a credible guarantee of the Benue governorship ticket for Zone C, all other concessions will be dismissed as tactical.
    • Resolution of APC’s Internal Crisis: Allegations of imposition and manipulation within the party must be addressed through credible mediation.

    Conclusion

    The marginalisation of Benue Zone C is no longer a local grievance, it is a strategic vulnerability with national consequences. Left unresolved, it threatens to dismantle APC’s grassroots machinery in Benue, flip a critical state, and weaken President Tinubu’s standing across the North-Central region.

    The ADC’s advance into Zone C is structured, deliberate, and increasingly irreversible. The window for intervention is closing.

    Unless decisive action is taken, Benue State may well become the first domino in a chain reaction that imperils Tinubu’s 2027 re-election bid.

    Chris Echikwu is a public affairs analyst.

  • Nigeria’s Commodity Exchange Gap: A Costly Weak Link in Africa’s Largest Economy

    Nigeria’s Commodity Exchange Gap: A Costly Weak Link in Africa’s Largest Economy

    How structured trading platforms can unlock billions in agricultural value and transform industrial competitiveness

    By Chris Echikwu

    Nigeria’s industrial sector consumes more than ten million metric tons of agricultural commodities each year, yet the absence of a fully functional and liquid commodity exchange continues to impose enormous costs on manufacturers, farmers, and the broader economy. Industry experts warn that fragmented trading systems, weak price discovery, and inconsistent quality standards are undermining productivity across key value chains in Africa’s largest economy.

    From breweries struggling to secure stable maize supplies to food processors being subjected to inefficient and substandard input supplies, Nigeria’s agro-industrial ecosystem operates largely through opaque and inefficient informal markets. These inefficiencies, analysts say, translate into billions of naira in avoidable losses annually.

    A Market Defined by Inefficiency

    Available data paints a stark picture. Nigerian industries process roughly 1.3 million metric tons of palm oil annually for food, cosmetics, and household products, yet price markups between farm gate and factory often reach as high as 70 percent. Breweries consume an estimated 400,000 metric tons of sorghum every year, but face price volatility exceeding 40 percent within a single crop cycle.

    Meanwhile, the country’s textile industry uses just 70,000 metric tons of cotton annually—far below its installed capacity—due largely to unreliable supply chains and inconsistent quality. The decline has contributed to the collapse of an industry that once employed millions.

    At the heart of these challenges is poor price discovery. Most commodity transactions occur through bilateral negotiations involving multiple intermediaries, creating information asymmetries that inflate costs for manufacturers while depressing incomes for farmers. In some cases, processors pay above-market prices even as producers in nearby regions receive less than fair value, with intermediaries capturing disproportionate margins.

    Quality and Financing Constraints

    Quality inconsistency further compounds the problem. Manufacturers routinely receive maize with varying moisture levels, palm oil with fluctuating fatty acid content, and cocoa beans lacking standardized fermentation. These variations increase processing costs, reduce output quality, and frequently lead to commercial disputes, disputes made harder to resolve in the absence of enforceable grading standards or arbitration mechanisms.

    Financing gaps also persist. Commercial banks remain reluctant to lend against physical commodities due to concerns over price volatility and quality verification. As a result, farmers struggle to access production credit, while small and medium-scale manufacturers face working capital constraints. The outcome is a low-investment equilibrium that suppresses productivity across entire value chains.

    How a Functional Commodity Exchange Could Help

    Analysts argue that a properly structured commodity exchange would address many of these systemic failures. Transparent, centralized trading platforms with publicly visible prices would reduce information asymmetries and shift negotiations toward market-based pricing. Farmers would gain clearer price signals, improving production planning and reducing exploitation.

    Futures trading, in particular, could be transformative. By locking in prices months ahead, food processors and manufacturers could hedge against seasonal price spikes, stabilize budgets, and reduce speculative inventory costs. International evidence suggests that active futures markets can reduce commodity price volatility by 20 to 30 percent.

    Standardized quality grading enforced through independent certification would further enhance efficiency. Exchange-traded contracts define precise quality parameters, while certified warehouses provide third-party verification. This system allows buyers to purchase commodities without inspecting every lot and rewards producers who invest in quality with measurable price premiums.

    Unlocking Credit Through Warehouse Receipts

    The warehouse receipt system (WRS) is another critical component. Farmers who store produce in certified warehouses receive receipts representing verified quantity and quality. These receipts can be used as collateral, enabling banks to lend with greater confidence. The system helps farmers avoid distress sales during harvest gluts while ensuring year-round supply for industrial users.

    Broader Economic Impact

    The macroeconomic implications are significant. Improved price discovery and quality assurance could attract investment into mechanization, better inputs, and improved agronomic practices. Even modest productivity gains in agriculture, employing about 35 percent of Nigeria’s labour force, could add billions to GDP and generate jobs across logistics, processing, and trade.

    Industrial competitiveness would also improve. Studies from comparable economies suggest that functional commodity exchanges can lower industrial input costs by 15 to 25 percent. For Nigeria, this could reduce dependence on imports of palm oil, food products, and textiles, saving hundreds of millions of naira annually, while enabling premium exports of cocoa, sesame, ginger, and niche products such as hibiscus (“zobo”).

    Institutional Challenges Remain

    Despite its potential, Nigeria’s commodity exchange ecosystem faces institutional hurdles. While several exchanges exist, trading volumes remain low due to limited warehouse infrastructure, weak regulatory enforcement, and insufficient market participation.

    International experience offers clear lessons. Ethiopia’s commodity exchange, launched in 2008, now trades more than 700,000 metric tons annually, transforming price transparency and farmer incomes. India’s commodity exchange network handles over 100 million metric tons each year, supporting the world’s second-largest agricultural economy.

    For Nigeria, experts argue, the issue is not proof of concept but political and institutional commitment. With industrial demand exceeding ten million metric tons annually and inefficiencies draining billions from the economy, the case for prioritizing commodity market infrastructure has become increasingly urgent.

    Chris Echikwu is a former General Manager for Corporate Communications and Strategy at the Nigeria Commodity Exchange, Abuja.

    Mr Chris Echikwu is a former General Manager, Corporate Communications and Strategy, Nigeria Commodity Exchange, Abuja.